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YOU’RE FIRED!  SPECIAL COUNSEL REMOVAL AUTHORITY 
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Adrianne C. Blake∗ 
“Those who cannot remember the past  
are condemned to repeat it.” - George Santayana1 
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1875, only five years after the Department of Justice (DOJ)
was organized as a separate executive department, President Ulysses 
S. Grant appointed the nation’s first special prosecutor.2  John B.
Henderson was appointed to investigate a robust network of whiskey
distillers, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents, Department of
Treasury (DOTR) clerks, and others who were accused of diverting
federal liquor tax revenue into their personal pockets and political
campaigns.3  Investigator Henderson’s inquiry upended the infamous
“Whiskey Ring.”4  The investigation ultimately led to indictments of
∗ J.D. Candidate, December 2018, University of Baltimore School of Law; M.P.S.,
Paralegal Studies, May 2010, George Washington University; B.S., Administration of
Justice, May 2005, George Mason University.  To my husband, Jared, for his
devotion; to my parents and six siblings, for their influence; to my grandmother,
Doris, for her support; to Professor Hugh McClean, for his wisdom; to my true
friends, for their encouragement; to the editors and staff of the University of Baltimore
Law Review, for their dedication: thank you, all.
1. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON: OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS 284
(1905).
2. Stephan O. Kline, Heal It, Don’t Bury It! Testimony on Reauthorization of the
Independent Counsel Act, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C. L. 51, 53 (1999)
(citing Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J.
2307, 2312 (1998)).  At differing times in our nation’s history, individuals appointed
to investigate and potentially prosecute alleged criminal violations of federal law have
been referred to as “independent counsels,” “special prosecutors,” or “special
counsels.” JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43112, INDEPENDENT 
COUNSELS, SPECIAL PROSECUTORS, SPECIAL COUNSELS, AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
1–2, 2 n.8 (2013).  The Justice Department currently uses the term “special counsel,”
as shown in 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–10 (2018).  Id.
3. Sarah Pruitt, The Whiskey Ring and America’s First Special Prosecutor, HIST. (May
18, 2017), http://www.history.com/news/the-whiskey-ring-and-americas-first-special-
prosecutor.
4. See Kline, supra note 2, at 53.
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high-level advisors to President Grant, including his trusted friend 
and personal secretary, General Orville E. Babcock.5 
In an effort to protect General Babcock, President Grant attempted 
to have him tried by a military tribunal instead of by a federal jury.6  
However, Henderson declined to share requisite investigative 
documents with the military tribunal.7  At a related trial of a DOTR 
official, Henderson used his closing argument to imply that President 
Grant was involved in the cover-up.8  These actions sealed 
Henderson’s fate.9  President Grant swiftly fired him “for his 
aggressive and impertinent behavior,”10 and replaced him with 
attorney James Broadhead.11   
This incident demonstrated the need for special counsel to 
investigate matters spanning multiple executive agencies and even 
involving a president’s own staff.12  During this time, President Grant 
exercised his executive authority to both appoint and dismiss the 
nation’s first special prosecutor.13  The investigation resulted in the 
conviction of 110 of the 238 indicted conspirators and the recovery 
of more than $3 million in embezzled tax funds.14   
Since the Whiskey Ring scandal, the DOJ, with input from 
Congress and the federal judiciary, has developed processes to 
appoint and remove special counsel.15  However, this evolution is not 
yet complete, and it remains an unsettled area of the federal 
government’s legal landscape.16   
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.  Investigator Henderson stated “[w]hat right has the President to interfere with the
honest discharge of the duties of a Secretary of the Treasury?  None, whatsoever.”  Id.
9. See id.
10. Kline, supra note 2, at 53 (citing Smaltz, supra note 2, at 2312).
11. See Pruitt, supra note 3.
12. See id.; see also Kline, supra note 2, at 53 (describing the need for special
independent investigators due to “[a] lack of confidence in the fledgling Department
of Justice’s ability to investigate friends of the President”).
13. See Pruitt, supra note 3.
14. Id.
15. See discussion infra Parts II–IV.
16. See Doreen McCallister, Senators Introduce 2 Bills to Try to Keep Trump from Firing
Mueller, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 4, 2017, 3:56 AM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/04/541523326/senators-introduce-2-bills-to-try-to-keep
-trump-from-firing-mueller; see also Karoun Demirjian, Senators Unveil Two
Proposals to Protect Mueller’s Russia Probe, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/senators-unveil-two-proposals-to-protect-muell
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This Comment argues that special counsel can be protected by 
enacting legislation that contains key provisions which will not 
violate the separation of powers.17  Codifying current DOJ 
regulations will also prevent presidents from abusing their authority 
by attempting to remove DOJ-appointed special counsel without 
adequate cause.18 
This Comment will proceed in four parts following this 
introduction.  Part II discusses special counsel appointment and 
removal powers as outlined in the U.S. Constitution’s Appointments 
Clause and as supported by Supreme Court case law.19  Part III 
discusses the history of modern federal government special counsel 
powers enacted after the Watergate scandal, including the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978.20  Part III concludes by discussing DOJ 
special counsel regulatory guidance and current developments.21  Part 
IV provides a detailed analysis of proposed Senate Bills 1735 and 
174122 and outlines six elements of a constitutional and sustainable 
legislative measure.23  Part IV begins by explaining why legislation is 
needed to protect special counsel.24  Part IV concludes by 
demonstrating how a modified bill will strengthen executive power 
by eliminating uncertainty in the special counsel removal process.25 
II. SPECIAL COUNSEL APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL
A. Power to Appoint
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution outlines two means
through which federal government officers may be appointed: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, 
and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and 
ers-russia-probe/2017/08/03/b980d082-787a-11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html 
(discussing recently proposed legislation). 
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Section IV.B.2.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Sections III.A–B.
21. See infra Sections III.C–D.
22. See infra Sections IV.A–B.
23. See infra Section IV.B.
24. See infra Section IV.C.
25. See infra Section IV.C.2.
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which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by 
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they 
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, 
or in the Heads of Departments.26 
The President has always had the power to appoint a special 
counsel.27  Congress does not have the power to appoint special 
counsel but has vested this appointment authority in the Attorney 
General, who is the head of the DOJ.28   
Agency regulations permit the Attorney General to delegate any of 
his duties “from time to time . . . as he considers appropriate . . . [to] 
any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of 
Justice.”29  As a principal officer,30 the Attorney General may task a 
special counsel, an inferior officer,31 to criminally investigate a 
person or a matter.32  In the event the Attorney General is recused,33 
the Acting Attorney General assumes the authority to appoint a 
special counsel in his stead.34 
B. Power to Remove
Presidents may not directly remove inferior officers that they did
not appoint.35  Even so, there are at least two ways the President 
could impede an investigation by a special counsel appointed by the 
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
27. William Cummings, Special Counsel vs. Special Prosecutor: What’s the Difference?,
USA TODAY (May 19, 2017, 10:33 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/politics/onpolitics/2017/05/18/special-counsel-vs-special-prosecutor-difference/3290
16001/.
28. 28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 515 (2012).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 510 (2012).
30. Principal officer is defined as “[a] United States officer appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”  Principal Officer, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
31. Inferior officer is defined as “[a] United States officer appointed by the President, by
a court, or by the head of a federal department.  Senate confirmation is not required.”
Inferior Officer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  See also Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (holding that an independent counsel is an
inferior officer).
32. 28 U.S.C. §§ 509–10, 515 (2012).
33. Recusal is defined as “[r]emoval of oneself as judge or policy-maker in a particular
matter, [especially] because of a conflict of interest.”  Recusal, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
34. 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–2 (2018).
35. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–84
(2010).
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Justice Department.36  First, because the President has authority over 
principal officers, he could order the Attorney General to remove a 
special counsel.37  Second, the President could repeal current DOJ 
regulations concerning special counsel and then fire a special counsel 
directly.38   
Congress’s role in the appointment and removal of a special 
counsel is indirect.39  Congress is typically unable to reserve 
appointment or removal powers for themselves.40  However, 
Congress can limit or restrict removal power if they determine it to 
be in the public’s interest.41   
Congress “has a recognized inherent authority for oversight of the 
executive agencies and departments of government.”42  Nevertheless, 
separation of powers principles dictate that the DOJ may exercise all 
functions of law enforcement, including the prosecution of federal 
crimes.43  This means that Congress may not directly appoint or 
remove criminal investigators.44  Congress may, however, remove 
36. See Neal Katyal, Trump or Congress Can Still Block Robert Mueller.  I Know.  I
Wrote the Rules., WASH. POST (May 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
posteverything/wp/2017/05/19/politics-could-still-block-muellers-investigation-i-kno
w-i-wrote-the-rules/.
37. See id.  This has occurred in the past.  See infra, Section III.A.
38. Katyal, supra note 36.
39. See MASKELL, supra note 2, at 1–2.
40. See Douglas Cox, Inferior Officers, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION,
https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/2/essays/92/inferior-officers (last
visited Nov. 10, 2018) (“Congress itself may not exercise the appointment power; its
functions are limited to the Senate’s role in advice and consent, and to deciding
whether to vest a direct appointment power over a given office in the President, a
Head of Department, or the Courts of Law.”).  But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
128 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that Congress has the “power to appoint its own
inferior officers to carry out appropriate legislative functions” (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 889 (D.C. 1975))) (emphasis added), superseded by statute,
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81, as
recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled on
other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); cf.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (concluding “that Congress cannot
reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the
laws except by impeachment”) (emphasis added).
41. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 n.27 (1988) (citing United States v. Perkins,
116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886)).
42. See MASKELL, supra note 2, at 1.
43. See id.
44. Id.
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federal government officers through the Constitution’s express 
powers of impeachment.45  
III. MODERN HISTORY OF SPECIAL COUNSEL
INVESTIGATIONS
Since the Whiskey Ring scandal,46 U.S. presidents and DOJ 
leadership have appointed investigators to examine criminal 
allegations within the Executive Branch such as bribery, fraud, and 
corruption.47  The 20th century’s most prominent special counsel 
investigation resulted in the resignation of then-President Richard M. 
Nixon.48   
A. Watergate and the Saturday Night Massacre
Before President Nixon’s 1972 reelection, five men broke into the
Democratic National Committee Headquarters located in the 
Watergate complex.49  The burglars were later found to have 
connections to the Nixon Administration.50  In the aftermath of this 
discovery, several of Nixon’s closest advisors resigned or were 
relieved for conspiring to cover-up the incident.51  Nixon, himself, 
did not emerge unscathed.52  By April 1973, the President was 
without an attorney general or top executive aides.53  Congress, 
concerned over the emerging corruption allegations, desired that a 
special prosecutor be appointed to investigate the incident.54  As a 
condition of his appointment to Attorney General, congressional 
leadership pressured nominee Elliot Richardson to investigate.55  
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the
sole Power to try all Impeachments.”); infra Section IV.C.1.
46. See supra Part I.
47. See Fred Lucas, A Short History of Special Counsels and Presidents, DAILY SIGNAL
(June 12, 2017), http://dailysignal.com/2017/06/12/a-short-history-of-special-counsels
-and-presidents.
48. See Stanley Kutler, Richard M. Nixon, in THE PRESIDENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A 
LIVING HISTORY 491, 500 (Ken Gormley, ed., 2016).
49. Id. at 500.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Jim Mokhiber, A Brief History of the Independent Counsel Law, PUB. BROAD. SERV.:
FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/counsel/office/histor
y.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Upon his confirmation, Attorney General Richardson appointed 
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox.56   
In July 1973, the public became aware of an Oval Office recording 
system.57  Special Prosecutor Cox subpoenaed nine tapes from the 
President to determine if Nixon had also been involved in the 
Watergate cover-up.58  President Nixon refused to turn them over.59  
The President hoped to shift the Watergate investigation back into the 
hands of his political appointees at the DOJ.60  Unable to fire Special 
Prosecutor Cox himself, Nixon ordered Attorney General Richardson 
to fire him.61  On Saturday, October 20, 1973, Attorney General 
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus both 
declined to follow President Nixon’s order and resigned.62  Finally, 
Solicitor General Robert Bork agreed to fire Cox, and the political 
ramifications of the “Saturday Night Massacre” swiftly followed.63   
Congress initiated impeachment proceedings against the President 
and sought ways to ensure the independence of special prosecutors.64  
Nixon appointed a new special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, on the 
condition that he could not be removed by the President “without the 
consent of a majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee.”65   
President Nixon was ordered to turn over the incriminating Oval 
Office tapes, and he resigned days before impeachment proceedings 
were to convene.66  One month later, Nixon’s successor, President 
Gerald Ford, granted him “a full and unconditional pardon . . . for 
any crimes he may have committed related to the Watergate scandal 
or during his time as president.”67    
56. Id.
57. Kutler, supra note 48, at 500.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 501.
61. Id.
62. Mokhiber, supra note 53.
63. See Kutler, supra note 48, at 501.
64. See Mokhiber, supra note 53.
65. Id.
66. See Kutler, supra note 48, at 502–03 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
716 (1974)).
67. Id. at 503.
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B. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978
Watergate and its fallout led to the passage of the Ethics in
Government Act.68  President Jimmy Carter believed that requiring 
the Attorney General to investigate allegations of Executive Branch 
misconduct would “keep [public officials] honest.”69  
1. The Act’s Provisions
Signed into law by President Carter,70 the Act implemented a two-
step process71 for appointing an independent counsel.72  First, the 
Attorney General would complete a preliminary inquiry to determine 
whether an independent investigation was necessary.73  If warranted, 
the Attorney General would request that a three-judge panel appoint 
an independent counsel to investigate.74  The Act shifted appointment 
power of the special counsel tasked with investigating the Executive 
out of the hands of the President and into the hands of the three-judge 
panel.75  Furthermore, the Act dictated an independent counsel’s 
scope of authority,76 how one could be removed,77 and conditions 
under which independent counsel inquiries could be terminated.78  
68. See Joseph S. Hall, Nicholas Pullen & Kandace Rayos, Independent Counsel
Investigations, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 809, 811–12 (1999) (explaining that at least
three different bills were proposed in Congress before the successful passage of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–99 (1994)).
69. Paul Francis Lughlin, Ethics in Government Act, White Collar Crime: Fifth Survey of
Law: Substantive Crimes, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 789, 789 (1988) (quoting Jimmy
Carter, U.S. President, Miami Beach, Florida, Remarks at a State Democratic Party
Rally (Oct. 26, 1978), transcript available online courtesy of Gerhard Peters & John
T. Woolley, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
miami-beach-florida-remarks-state-democratic-party-rally (last visited Nov. 10,
2018)).
70. See Mokhiber, supra note 53.
71. See CYNTHIA BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44857, SPECIAL COUNSELS,
INDEPENDENT COUNSELS, AND SPECIAL PROSECUTORS: OPTIONS FOR INDEPENDENT
EXECUTIVE INVESTIGATIONS 3–4 (2017).
72. See MASKELL, supra note 2, at 2.
73. See BROWN, supra note 71, at 4–5.
74. Id. at 5; see also MASKELL, supra note 2, at 2.  The court was physically seated in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  See BROWN, supra note 71, at 5.
Judges or justices were appointed to the court by the Chief Supreme Court Justice for
two-year assignments.  Id.
75. See BROWN, supra note 71, at 5.
76. Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 6–7.
78. Id. at 7.
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The Act was invoked eleven times within the first four years of its 
enactment, resulting in the appointment of three independent 
counsel.79   
2. Constitutionality of the Act
Initial authority for the Ethics in Government Act was set to expire
five years after its creation.80  In 1982, Congress amended the law, 
giving the Attorney General power to remove an appointed special 
prosecutor for good cause.81  With this change, Congress ensured 
continued authorization for independent counsel by reauthorizing the 
Act in 198382 and again in 1987.83   
 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Ethics in 
Government Act’s independent counsel provision and its use of a 
three-judge panel in the 1988 case of Morrison v. Olson.84  The Court 
determined that the Act did not violate the Appointments Clause or 
separation of powers because Congress did not intend to see and 
increase their own power when they passed the law.85  The Court 
found that executive powers were not “impermissibly”86 hampered 
by the good cause standard for removal.87  Furthermore, the judicial 
panel’s authority to appoint independent special counsel did not 
excessively interfere with any role of the Executive Branch.88   
79. See Mokhiber, supra note 53.
80. BROWN, supra note 71, at 7, 7 n.59.
81. Good cause is defined as “[a] legally sufficient reason.”  Good Cause, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also BROWN, supra note 71, at 7 (explaining that a
physical or mental condition inhibiting one’s ability to perform investigative duties
also warranted special counsel removal).
82. Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983).
83. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–191, 101 Stat.
1293 (1987).
84. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 676 (1988) (“In this case, however, we do not think
it impermissible for Congress to vest the power to appoint independent counsel in a
specially created federal court.”).
85. See Mokhiber, supra note 53.
86. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692–93.
87. Id. at 691 (“[W]e cannot say that the imposition of a ‘good cause’ standard for
removal by itself unduly trammels on executive authority.”).
88. See id. at 693–96.
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3. The Act’s Final Expiration
The Ethics in Government Act expired again in 1992 but was
reauthorized in 199489 to allow for Special Investigator Kenneth Starr 
to investigate Bill and Hillary Clinton’s involvement in the 
Whitewater real estate development controversy.90  Criticism of the 
law peaked when citizens learned that Starr spent upwards of $70 
million on probes spanning more than four years.91   
After Whitewater, the general consensus within Congress was that 
independent counsel enjoyed too much power and spent too much 
time and money, without results, on allegations that were politically 
driven.92  Congress allowed the Act to expire under sunset provisions 
in 1999,93 and it has not been reauthorized since.94  Consequently, 
the President’s authority to appoint and remove special counsel 
tasked with investigating the Executive Branch expanded.95  The 
President’s power was increased by virtue of no longer sharing 
appointment power with the judicial panel established for this 
purpose.96   
It is unlikely that the now-void Ethics in Government Act will ever 
be reenacted because of the politics surrounding the breadth of its 
89. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–270, 108 Stat.
732 (1994).
90. See Lucas, supra note 47; BROWN, supra note 71, at 4.
91. Callum Borchers, Special Prosecutors Are a Big Deal. Their Results Sometimes
Aren’t., WASH. POST (May 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/05/10/want-a-special-prosecutor-to-replace-james-comey-history-might-
change-your-mind/; see also David Johnston, Attorney General Taking Control as
Independent Counsel Law Dies, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 1999), https://www.nytimes
.com/1999/06/30/us/attorney-general-taking-control-as-independent-counsel-law-dies.
html.  The Whitewater investigation followed the Iran-Contra affair, and the cost of
that investigation totaled $39 million.  See Borchers, supra.  While eleven individuals
were convicted for their involvement in Iran-Contra, all of the convictions were
overturned on appeal, resulting in no confinement for any of those involved.  Id.
92. See BROWN, supra note 71, at 7; see also Jonathan L. Entin, Learning the Right
Lesson from Watergate: The Special Prosecutor and the Independent Counsel, 16
CHAP. L. REV. 151, 159 (2012) (“The . . . special prosecutor was a political response
to a political crisis.”).
93. See BROWN, supra note 71, at 7.
94. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
95. See Demirjian, supra note 16 (“[T]he [P]resident’s authority to hire and fire special
counsels . . . fell more squarely under the [E]xecutive’s purview after Congress let an
independent-counsel law . . . expire in 1999 . . . .”).
96. Id.
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scope.97  However, this does not preclude Congress from adopting a 
less comprehensive bipartisan measure.98 
C. Current Department of Justice Regulations
When Congress enacts legislation, federal agencies often
implement and enforce the law by promulgating regulations.99  The 
Administrative Procedure Act100 authorizes agencies to create 
regulations, even if no codified law supports them, so long as the 
policies comport with statutory law and the Constitution.101  Only 
Congress may repeal an enacted law; the President has no authority 
to do so.102  The President may, however, repeal agency 
regulations.103   
In 1999, in anticipation of the Ethics in Government Act’s 
expiration, and before any similar law was enacted, the Justice 
Department promulgated regulations for the appointment and 
removal of special counsel.104  At the time, legal experts generally 
agreed that the Act no longer enhanced public confidence in 
executive investigations.105  As a result, when the DOJ promulgated 
the new regulations, several safeguards were implemented to avoid 
some of the drawbacks experienced under the expired Act.106  
97. See Entin, supra note 92, at 160.
98. See infra Section IV.A.
99. Regulatory Activity, LEXISNEXIS.COM, http://www.lexisnexis.com/help/cu/The_Legis
lative_Process/Stage_9.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
100. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
101. A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, https://www.
federalregister.gov/uploads/2013/09/The-Rulemaking-Process.pdf (lasted visited Sept.
26, 2018) (explaining that agency regulations are published in the Federal Register
and codified annually).
102. See Richard H. Pildes, Could Congress Simply Codify the DOJ Special Counsel
Regulations?, LAWFARE (Aug. 3, 2017, 3:27 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/could-cong
ress-simply-codify-doj-special-counsel-regulations.
103. See Stuart Shapiro, What New Presidents Can (and Cannot) Do About Regulation,
HILL: PUNDITS BLOG (Dec. 23, 2015, 7:30 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/presidential-campaign/264084-what-new-presidents-can-and-cannot-do-about.
104. 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–10 (2018); see also Pildes, supra note 102.
105. See Implementation of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Special Counsel Regulations:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5–6 (2008), https://scholarship.law.georgetown
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=cong [hereinafter 2008 Hearing]
(statement of Professor Neal Kumar Katyal, Georgetown University Law Center).
For instance, then-Attorney General Janet Reno and her deputy, Eric Holder, believed
the Act failed to incentivize special prosecutors to exercise restraint.  Id.
106. See id. at 6–7.
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For example, a special counsel is still required to submit a final 
report at the conclusion of an investigation, but it is no longer 
publically available.107  In theory, given that a report is now 
submitted privately to the Attorney General, a special counsel has 
less of an incentive to pursue an unwarranted investigation.108   
 Outside counsel are typically appointed when the issue to be 
investigated may cause conflict of interest issues for agency 
personnel109 or under “other extraordinary circumstances.”110  
Whether appointed from within or externally to the agency, special 
counsel are not entirely independent.111  While mostly autonomous 
during an investigation and any potential prosecution, they must 
consult and report to the individual who appointed them.112  Current 
regulations also afford the Attorney General the opportunity to 
supersede the decisions of any special counsel.113  However, the 
Attorney General may only remove a special counsel for 
“misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or 
for other good cause.”114   
Despite these regulatory measures, in the past two decades, no 
statutory protections have been enacted to prevent “another ‘Saturday 
Night Massacre.’”115  This becomes increasingly significant when a 
special counsel, empowered by agency regulations, is tasked with 
investigating potential misdeeds of an incumbent administration.116  
If a special counsel appointed by the DOJ is improperly removed by 
a President, the public will lack confidence in the government, 
thereby weakening our democracy.117   
107. See id. at 7; 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c) (2018) (outlining special counsel notification and
report requirements).
108. 2008 Hearing, supra note 105, at 7.
109. See MASKELL, supra note 2, at 3.
110. Cummings, supra note 27 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (2010)).
111. See Phil Helsel, ‘Special Counsel’ Less Independent than Under Expired Watergate-
Era Law, NBC NEWS (May 17, 2017, 9:58 PM), https://www.nbcnews.
com/news/us-news/special-counsel-less-independent-under-expired-watergate-era-
law-n761311.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 600.7 (2018).
114. 28 C.F.R. § 607(d).
115. Lucas, supra note 47; see also Pildes, supra note 102.
116. See Demirjian, supra note 16.
117. See Editorial Board, The Senate Warns Trump: Leave Mueller Be, WASH. POST (Oct.
7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-senate-warns-trump-leave-m
ueller-be/2017/10/07/88c4db7e-a7b8-11e7-92d1-58c702d2d975_story.html.
2018 Special Counsel Removal Authority 105 
D. Alleged Interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
Shortly after the 2016 presidential race, Trump campaign members
were accused of colluding with Russia to influence the election’s 
outcome.118  These accusations prompted the appointment of a 
special counsel to investigate the matter.119  At that time, Jeff 
Sessions, President Donald Trump’s former campaign advisor who 
was subsequently appointed as Attorney General, recused himself 
from all campaign-related legal matters.120  As a result, Deputy 
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller as a 
special counsel.121  Investigator Mueller was charged to investigate 
“any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and 
individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald 
Trump.”122   
IV. THE WAY AHEAD
A. Two Legislative Proposals
In August 2017, lawmakers introduced legislative measures in an
effort to shield special counsel from political interference.123  Senate 
118. See Mark Landler & Eric Lichtblau, Jeff Sessions Recuses Himself from Russia
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/us/politics
/jeff-sessions-russia-trump-investigation-democrats.html.
119. Id.; see also Demirjian, supra note 16.
120. Landler & Lichtblau, supra note 118; see supra note 33 and accompanying text.  Jeff
Sessions resigned from his position as Attorney General on November 7, 2018.  Peter
Baker, Katie Benner & Michael D. Shear, Jeff Sessions Is Forced out as Attorney
General as Trump Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/11/07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html.
121. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORDER NO. 3915-2017, APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL TO
INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND
RELATED MATTERS (2017) [hereinafter Mueller Appointment Memo].
122. Id.  Presently, that special prosecutor investigation is still ongoing.  See George
Stephanopoulos, Eliana Larramendia, James Hill & Lauren Pearle, Michael Cohen
Pleads Guilty to Lying to Congress in New Deal with Mueller in Trump-Russia Probe,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2018, 12:32 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/ Politics/michael-
cohen-expected-plead-guilty-lying-congress-collusion/story?id=5949 1450 (indicating
that Investigator Mueller is presently preparing his final investigative report).
123. Brandon Carter, Dem Senator: Mueller Must Be Protected from ‘Another Saturday
Night Massacre’, HILL (Dec. 1, 2017, 9:21 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/
362894-dem-senator-mueller-must-be-protected-from-another-saturday-night-massacr
e. Since August 2017, these measures have been revised numerous times by
Congress, and the latest bill proposed (but not yet passed) to address this issue is
entitled the “Special Counsel Independence and Integrity Act,” first introduced to the
Senate on April 26, 2018.  Special Counsel Independence and Integrity Act, S. 2644,
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Bill 1735, named the “Special Counsel Independence Protection 
Act,” was sponsored by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Cory 
Booker (D-NJ).124  Senate Bill 1741, named the “Special Counsel 
Integrity Act,” was sponsored by Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC) and 
Christopher Coons (D-DE).125 
The goal of each bipartisan bill is to prevent the wrongful firing of 
a special counsel appointed under DOJ regulations.126  During a 
September 2017 hearing conducted by the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary,127 legal scholars deemed each Act’s objectives to be 
“important,”128 “reasonable,”129 “laudable,”130 and “appropriate.”131 
115th Cong. (2018); see also Jordain Carney, Flake to Try to Force Vote on Bill 
Protecting Mueller, HILL: FLOOR ACTION (Nov. 8, 2018, 4:14 PM), https://thehill. 
com/blogs/floor-action/senate/415792-flake-to-try-to-force-vote-on-bill-protecting-m 
ueller; Jordain Carney, Flake: Mueller Bill Has Votes to Pass Senate, HILL: FLOOR
ACTION (Nov. 30, 2018, 9:55 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/4190 
84-flake-mueller-bill-has-votes-to-pass-senate.
124. Special Counsel Independence Protection Act, S. 1735, 115th Cong. (2017); Booker,
Graham, Coons, Tillis Introduce Merged Legislation, the Special Counsel
Independence and Integrity Act, U.S. SENATE (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.booker.
senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=769.
125. Special Counsel Integrity Act, S. 1741, 115th Cong. (2017); U.S. SENATE, supra note
124.
126. McCallister, supra note 16.
127. Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017).  Although no certified
transcript of the proceeding is currently available, a videotape recording of the
hearing is available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/special-counsels-
and-the-separation-of-powers.
128. Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2, 7 (2017), https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-26-17%20Duffy%20Testimony%20UPDATE.pdf
(statement of John F. Duffy, Professor, University of Virginia School of Law).
129. Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 9 (2017), https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-26-17%20Posner%20Testimony.pdf (statement of Eric
A. Posner, Professor, University of Chicago Law School).
130. Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 1 (2017), https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-26-17%20Amar%20Testimony.pdf (statement of Akil
Reed Amar, Professor, Yale Law School).
131. Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 12 (2017), https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-26-17%20Vladeck%20Testimony.pdf (statement of
Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor, University of Texas School of Law).
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Both bills recommend using a three-judge panel to review 
proposed dismissals of special counsel.132  Additionally, both bills 
use identical language regarding removal for cause.133  While the 
proposed bills share commonalities, they are fundamentally different 
in certain respects.134  First, they vary regarding who may bring a 
claim for improper removal and how to do it.135 The bills differ over 
whether the judicial panel should be held to a deadline for rendering 
a decision136 and whether Congress must be notified.137  In addition, 
the bills diverge over whether any of the provisions should apply 
retroactively.138   
This Comment argues that a sustainable legislative measure is 
needed and requires four essential provisions: 1) oversight by a three-
judge panel to review removal actions;139 2) language codifying 
current DOJ regulations;140 3) a clear appeal framework for special 
counsel who wish to challenge their removal;141 and 4) a strict 
deadline for judicial review.142  Two additional elements are non-
essential, but they will make a proposed measure more effective: 5) a 
requirement that the Attorney General inform congressional judiciary 
committees whenever a special counsel is removed for any reason;143 
and 6) elimination of any retroactive effective date provisions.144  A 
comparative analysis of both proposed measures follows.145   
B. Elements of a Successful Legislative Measure
1. Use of a Three-Judge Panel for Review
A special counsel who believes that they have been unjustly
removed should be afforded the opportunity to seek review from a 
three-judge panel established by Congress specifically for this 
132. See infra Section IV.B.1.
133. See infra Section IV.B.2.
134. See infra Sections IV.B.3–6.
135. See infra Section IV.B.3.
136. See infra Section IV.B.4.
137. See infra Section IV.B.5.
138. See infra Section IV.B.6.
139. See infra Section IV.B.1.
140. See infra Section IV.B.2.
141. See infra Section IV.B.3.
142. See infra Section IV.B.4.
143. See infra Section IV.B.5.
144. See infra Section IV.B.6.
145. See infra Sections IV.B.1–6.
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purpose.146  The Special Counsel Independence Protection Act and 
the Special Counsel Integrity Act both seek to codify the use of a 
three-judge court147 to review special counsel removal actions.148  
Using a three-judge panel ensures that a special counsel is able to act 
independently—without fear of improper dismissal.149  The 
provisions of both bills place adequate limitations on the removal of 
special counsel.150     
U.S. Code permits Congress to convene three-judge district courts 
when required.151  Challenges to these judicial decisions receive 
automatic appeal to the Supreme Court.152  In the past, Congress has 
instituted similar special courts to consider matters such as antitrust 
cases, railroad cases, and certain suits under the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.153  Three-judge panels were also convened to appoint special 
prosecutors under the now-expired Ethics in Government Act.154   
Utilizing a three-judge panel has proven to be “a rather effective 
means of ameliorating the inevitable frictions and reducing the 
opportunities for abuse” that are destined to arise in politically 
charged legal issues.155  Using multiple judges, in lieu of a single 
judge, helps to mitigate bias and error in decision-making.156  For 
these reasons, the use of a three-judge panel is an effective process to 
review the removal of special counsel.   
2. Removal for Cause Language
One of the main purposes of both the Special Counsel
Independence Protection Act and the Special Counsel Integrity Act is 
to codify the language of current DOJ regulations.157  Both proposals 
146. See infra notes 147–56.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2012).
148. Special Counsel Independence Protection Act, S. 1735, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017);
Special Counsel Integrity Act, S. 1741, 115th Cong. § 2(d)(2) (2017).
149. See Demirjian, supra note 16.
150. S. 1735 § 2(b); S. 1741 § 2(d)(2).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012).
153. David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1964).
154. See supra Section III.B.  Unlike their use in the Ethics in Government Act, here, the
judicial panels would only be used to hear and review decisions to remove special
counsel, not to appoint them.  See S. 1735 § 2(b); S. 1741 § 2(d)(2).
155. See Currie, supra note 153, at 1, 7–8, 12.
156. Id. at 7.
157. See Special Counsels and the Separation of Powers, supra note 129 (“[T]he bills
duplicate the for-cause provision already in [Justice Department] regulations.”).
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dictate that a special counsel may only be removed on the basis of 
“misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or 
for other good cause, including violation of [DOJ] policies.”158  This 
language is the same as that promulgated by the DOJ and codified in 
the Code of Federal Regulations.159   
Some may argue that current DOJ regulations are sufficient and no 
additional codification is needed.160  However, agency regulations 
that are not codified can be repealed by the President.161  As a result, 
this provision is one of the most important elements proposed in both 
measures.162  Codifying the removal for cause language would close 
a current loophole between the U.S. Code and DOJ regulations.163  
Closing this gap would prevent a president from unjustifiably 
removing a DOJ-appointed special counsel.164 
3. Appeal Framework for Relieved Special Counsel
Under Special Counsel Independence Protection Act provisions,
the Attorney General must file an action for judicial review before 
the special counsel may be removed.165  The special counsel remains 
appointed until after review by a three-judge panel.166 
Conversely, the Special Counsel Integrity Act proposes to 
implement traditional notice, removal, and appeal measures requiring 
the special counsel to act,167 similar to those employed against other 
poorly performing federal employees.168  If implemented, special 
158. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d) (2018); S. 1735 § 2(c); see also Editorial Board, supra note 117
(“Under the Justice Department regulations by which Mr. Mueller was appointed, the
attorney general may fire the special counsel only for cause, such as misconduct.”).
159. See supra note 157 and accompanying text; see also 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d); S. 1735 §
2(c); S. 1741 § 2(b).
160. See Vladeck, supra note 131, at 1.
161. See supra notes 38, 102–03 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
163. See Pildes, supra note 102.
164. See Posner, supra note 129, at 9 (explaining that the removal for cause provision
provides “reasonable additional job protection in the form of judicial review of the
for-clause removal provision that already exists in [DOJ] regulation[s]”); see also
Vladeck, supra note 131, at 6.
165. Special Counsel Independence Protection Act, S. 1735, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017).
166. S. 1735 § 2(b)–(c).
167. Special Counsel Integrity Act, S. 1741, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).
168. Cf. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., MANAGING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ PERFORMANCE ISSUES 
1, 9–10 (2018), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/employee-relations/
reference-materials/managing-federal-employees’-performance-issues-or-misconduct
.pdf (outlining the methods used to remove non-probationary, competitive service
federal employees by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)).  Permanent,
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counsel could be removed as long as they have first been informed of 
the reason for their removal.169  This proposal places the 
responsibility on the removed individual to bring a case forward for 
review.170  If a special counsel believes that the removal was 
unfounded, they may file a review action with the court.171  If the 
judiciary agrees, the special counsel is immediately reinstated.172 
The Special Counsel Independence Protection Act’s filing 
provisions are more efficient than the Special Counsel Integrity 
Act.173  Removal and subsequent reinstatement of an official would 
likely create additional work or increase administrative costs for the 
Attorney General compared to a special counsel remaining on the job 
while removal for cause review is pending.174   
However, legal experts believe this method is unusual.175  For 
example, federal employees deemed to be a threat to agency mission, 
systems, or property are typically removed from their worksite and 
relocated after they are provided notice of alleged wrongdoing.176  In 
extreme circumstances, employees are placed on administrative leave 
until an investigation is complete.177  They cannot be reinstated until 
they are cleared of any wrongdoing.178  This is done because the 
integrity of the investigative process is better protected when an 
individual is removed and reinstated than when an individual is 
allowed to remain on the job, potentially committing additional 
damage.179  The work quality and effectiveness of an employee under 
competitive service federal employees are entitled to advanced written notice and 
appeal measures before their final removal from federal service.  Id. at 13.  
Employees may be placed on a performance improvement plan (PIP), but lack of a 
PIP does not preclude the agency from removing a poor-performing employee.  Id. at 
5–6. 
169. S. 1741 § 2(c).
170. Id. § 2(d)(1).
171. Id. § 2(b), (d)(1).
172. Id. § 2(d)(3).
173. See Posner, supra note 129, at 2.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 2 n.7.
176. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
177. See OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., Pay & Leave, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/pay-leave/leave-administration/fact-sheets/administrative-leave/ (last visited
Nov. 10, 2018).
178. See id.
179. See id.
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scrutiny can also be distracting to other employees and the agency’s 
mission.180 
The Special Counsel Independence Protection Act’s proposal is 
also unusual in that the claimant is not the one bringing the action in 
court.181  For this reason, it is unclear how the courts would respond 
to Special Counsel Independence Protection Act’s unique 
methodology.182  To survive judicial scrutiny, it is best for the special 
counsel to initiate the complaint, but either way, clear guidelines are 
a must.183 
4. Prompt Judicial Review of Removal for Cause Actions
When a special counsel is identified for removal under the Special
Counsel Independence Protection Act provisions, no deadline is 
imposed upon the judicial panel for making a final determination.184  
In theory, this means that the review of the decision to remove a 
special counsel could last indefinitely; thus, imposing a clear 
deadline brings a degree of certainty to the process.185 
After a special counsel is removed under Special Counsel Integrity 
Act provisions, the judicial panel must render a reinstatement 
decision within fourteen days from the date of filing.186  This two-
week suspense for judgment places a temporary pause on the 
investigation, but ultimately ensures prompt resolution.187  
Considering the infrequency with which three-judge panels were 
utilized under the Ethics in Government Act, it is unlikely the panel 
would have a high case load.188  For this reason, a two-week 
suspense is the best solution and should be strictly followed.189   
180. See id. (explaining that placing any federal employee on immediate non-duty status is
meant to be a “temporary solution”).
181. See Vladeck, supra note 131, at 6 (noting that the Attorney General files the removal
action).
182. See Special Counsels and Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 127 (testimony of Eric A. Posner,
Professor, University of Chicago Law School).
183. See Vladeck, supra note 131, at 11.
184. See Special Counsel Independence Protection Act, S. 1735, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).
185. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 5.
186. Special Counsel Integrity Act, S. 1741, 115th Cong. § 2(d)(2) (2017).
187. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 5.
188. See Special Counsels and Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 127 (testimony of John F. Duffy,
Professor, University of Virginia School of Law).
189. Duffy, supra note 128, at 5 (opining that a two-week waiting period limiting any
Attorney General order of removal would “provide adequate time at least for the
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5. Congressional Notification of Any Special Counsel Removal
When the Attorney General desires to remove a special counsel
under Special Counsel Independence Protection Act provisions, he 
must “file[] a contemporaneous notice of the action with the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the House of Representatives.”190  Under Special 
Counsel Integrity Act provisions, there is no requirement that 
Congress be notified when an action is filed by the special counsel.191  
However, because the House and Senate Judiciary Committees are 
responsible for oversight of investigations involving the Executive 
Branch, including those initiated by the Justice Department,192 
Congress should always be informed of a special counsel’s removal.    
 To increase transparency, the Attorney General should be required 
to inform Congress of the removal of any special counsel for any 
reason, not just removals that result in review actions.193  
Responsibility should be placed upon the Attorney General, because 
as agency head, this person is in the best position to know when a 
special counsel is relieved of their duties.194   
6. Elimination of Retroactive Provisions
Of the two proposed laws, only the Special Counsel Integrity Act
proposes a date of retroactive effectiveness.195  Retroactive 
provisions are “generally perceived . . . as unjust,”196 mostly because 
they do not provide adequate notice to those whose rights are 
affected.197  However, just as there are due process objections against 
retroactive legislation,198 an economic argument for its use can be 
made.  At times, efficient lawmaking justifies applying retroactive 
special counsel to file an action seeking judicial review of the removal order and for 
the court to grant any preliminary relief that they, in the exercise of their traditional 
equitable discretion, are willing to provide”). 
190. Special Counsel Independence Protection Act, S. 1735, 115th Cong. § 2(c) (2017).
191. Compare S. 1735 § 2(c) (requiring congressional notice if a special counsel is
removed by the Attorney General), with S. 1741 (containing no such provision).
192. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
195. Compare S. 1741 § 2(e) (containing a retroactive effective date of May 17, 2017),
with S. 1735 (containing no retroactive provision).
196. DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION 17 (1998).
197. Id. at 18.
198. See id. at 18–21.
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laws if the net gain to society as a whole outweighs the loss of rights 
to one individual.199   
But in the interest of promptly enacting a solution that would 
survive constitutional due process scrutiny, the retroactive provision 
in the Special Counsel Integrity Act should be removed.200  The 
proposed date of May 17, 2017, corresponds with the date 
Investigator Mueller was appointed.201  This bill’s effective date is 
clearly targeted to a specific investigation.202  Including this clause 
infuses politics into a process that needs to be administered 
objectively if it is meant to be sustainable and detracts from the 
important long-term goals of a protective act.203   
If a retroactive provision was to be adopted, it would be the first of 
its kind to strengthen an appointed position retroactively.204  
Additionally, increasing the inferior officer’s appointment after-the-
fact would potentially be at the expense of executive power.205  This 
also increases the risk that an act with a similar provision would be 
overturned if appealed.206    
C. Why a Legislative Measure Is Needed
If protective measures are not implemented, presidents could take
steps similar to those of President Nixon.207  A bipartisan legislative 
act is the best solution to regulate the dismissal of a special 
counsel.208  A legislative measure would prevent the President from 
199. See id. at 21–22.  If a cost-benefit analysis is applied to the current legislative
proposals, only the President would be considered a “loser[].”  See id. at 22.
200. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 5 (“The most constitutionally troubling aspect of S.
1741 is the combined effect of § 2(b) and § 2(e), which together seemed designed to
grant statutory tenure protection retroactively to a single known inferior officer in the
Department of Justice.”).
201. See Mueller Appointment Memo, supra note 121.
202. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 5.
203. See Entin, supra note 92, at 159.
204. Special Counsels and Separation of Powers: Hearing on S. 1735 and S. 1741 Before
the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 127 (testimony of John F. Duffy, Professor,
University of Virginia School of Law) (“There is no other precedence for such a
retroactive strengthening of tenure.”).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See supra Section III.A; see also Bruce Fein, Congress Should Protect Mueller from
Saturday Night Massacre, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 15. 2017), https://www.washington
times.com/news/2017/aug/15/trump-mueller-nixon-saturday-night-massacre/
(declaring that “[o]ne Saturday Night Massacre is enough!”).
208. Contra Amar, supra note 130, at 1–2 (expressing concerns over instituting such a
measure).
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removing an agency-appointed special counsel unless it was “for 
cause” and would allow for judicial review of a questionable 
removal.209  Furthermore, it would be within Congress’s power to 
repeal an act, if needed.210  Additionally, it would reassure the public 
that no one, including the President, is “above the law.”211 
1. Impeachment Alone Is Insufficient
Impeachment cannot be relied upon as a valid solution to punish a
president who has improperly fired a special counsel.212  To be 
impeached, a president’s actions would first need to constitute 
“treason, bribery, or other high crime[] and misdemeanor[].”213  
Meeting this high bar is particularly challenging when the President’s 
own party controls Congress.214  This is because it is politically risky 
to impeach a president of the same partisan affiliation.215  The two-
thirds Senate majority vote needed to remove the President is 
extremely difficult to obtain when politicians fear being ousted if 
they go against the majority party’s voting bloc.216  Based on recent 
history, it would likely take months for the House to pass an 
impeachment resolution and even longer for the Senate to convict a 
sitting president.217  And waiting to vote a poor-performing president 
out of office is no quicker.218 
209. See Posner, supra note 129, at 2.
210. See Shapiro, supra note 103.
211. Posner, supra note 129, at 9; see also Vladeck, supra note 131, at 1.
212. See Posner, supra note 129, at 7–8.
213. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, Lessons of Impeachment
History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 603, 605 (1999) (explaining that the Constitutional
Convention delegates specifically narrowed the definition of an impeachable offense
in an effort to curb the federal government’s ability to bring impeachment charges,
unlike the English Parliament’s sweeping authority to do so).
214. See John Hudak, The Political Risks of Impeachment, BROOKINGS INST. (May 23,
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/unpacked/2017/05/23/unpacked-the-political-
risks-of-impeachment/.
215. Id.  To date, politically-driven impeachment proceedings have never led to removal of
a U.S. president even when political party control differed between Congress and the
White House.  See id.
216. Id.  See Posner, supra note 129, at 7–8.
217. Joseph Milord, How Long Does It Take to Impeach a President? Recent History
Provides Context, ELITE DAILY (Sep. 21, 2017), https://www.elitedaily.com/news
/politics/heres-long-impeaching-president-take/2077271.  Impeachment proceedings
against President Bill Clinton lasted nearly six months in the late ‘90s.  See id.  The
24-hour news cycle and prolific use of social media by the general U.S. population
would likely speed up that timeline in the current era.  See id.
218. See Posner, supra note 129, at 8.
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2. A Protective Measure Strengthens Executive Power
A bill containing the preferred aforementioned provisions would
withstand constitutional scrutiny if challenged after enactment.219  
Many legal experts believe that the provisions of both bills, as 
currently written, are narrower than the now-expired Ethics in 
Government Act;220 neither bill seeks to give special counsel more 
power than the power granted to primary officers.221   
Some legal scholars believe that the two bills do not improve 
special counsel protections because the removal for cause statutory 
language set out in both bills is unclear.222  On the other hand, not 
enacting any legislation is just as problematic as equivocal 
definitions.223  Moreover, any ambiguity in the language used is 
rooted in current Justice Department policies, not the Senate Bills, 
which simply seek to codify the agency regulations.224   
It is also precarious to operate under the presumption that when a 
president asks for a special counsel to be removed the request is 
without merit.225  The approach taken by the Special Prosecutor 
Independence Protection Act inadvertently permits the President’s 
authority to be questioned by placing it in the hands of a judicial 
panel to determine if it has validity.226  Instead, allowing a removal to 
occur, even if the special counsel is ultimately reinstated, better 
preserves executive power and does not run counter to separation of 
powers principles.227     
219. See id. at 2–3; Vladeck, supra note 131, at 1.
220. See Vladeck, supra note 131, at 2 (“And even if there were five votes on the current
Supreme Court to overrule Morrison in an appropriate case (and I am skeptical that
there are), the far-less-intrusive nature of these bills in contrast to the independent
counsel statute suggests that they would not be the vehicle through which the Court
would choose to do so.”).
221. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text; cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
654–55 (1988) (finding that Congress vesting the appointment of independent counsel
in a special office specifically stood up for that purpose does not violate the
Appointments Clause).
222. See Amar, supra note 130, at 7–8.  Professor Amar asserts that if, for example, the
President gives a lawful order to a DOJ-appointed special counsel, and the inferior
officer does not obey the order, this satisfies the “for cause” threshold.  Id.  He
believes this to be a loophole that the President could use to unjustly remove a special
counsel even if current regulations are codified.  Id.
223. See Vladeck, supra note 131, at 12.
224. Id. at 7.
225. See Duffy, supra note 128, at 3–4.
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V. CONCLUSION
As history has shown, special counsel have played an essential role
in federal government oversight.228  They have conducted 
investigations when conflicts of interest have arisen within the 
DOJ,229 ensured that government leaders have not abused their 
positions, and prosecuted those officials who have done so.230   
Independence and protection must be afforded to special counsel so 
that they may properly investigate the federal government, including 
the Executive Branch.231  Presently, protective measures are not 
assured because DOJ regulations are not codified.232  If a solution to 
this problem is not enacted, a constitutional crisis could result.233  
Passing a legislative measure instilling judicial oversight, integrity, 
and consistency in the special counsel removal process is a step that 
Congress must take now—before it is too late.234 
228. See Demirjian, supra note 16.
229. See supra Section III.C.
230. See MASKELL, supra note 2, at 1–2.
231. See supra Section IV.A.
232. See supra Section IV.B.2.
233. See Editorial Board, supra note 117; see also Posner, supra note 129, at 9.
234. See supra Part IV and text accompanying note 1.
